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Abstract
The most widespread measure of individual welfare is consumer surplus 
(CS). If consumer surplus is to represent underlying preferences, very 
restrictive assumptions must be imposed and, worse, the resulting mea­
sures completely ignore distributional issues. Applied economists often 
argue that consumer surplus is a good approximation to the theoreti­
cally correct measures and the only feasible choice in practice. This is no 
longer true; recent advances in estimation techniques have made it pos­
sible to determine the approximate values of the correct measures quite 
satisfactorily. The theory and estimation of social welfare measures auto­
matically involves ethical and distributional judgements. Often, these are 
difficult to incorporate in intuitive summary indicators that are easy to 
estimate. A popular shortcut, summing up consumer surpluses or equiv­
alent variations, is ethically unacceptable; such measures treat Ecus as 
equals, not people. A range of money metric measures is presented that 
provide a more desirable, albeit still problematic alternative. Subject to 
severe data limitations, the theoretically correct welfare measures can be 
estimated for a wide range of modelling situations using parametric and 
nonparametric techniques.
’Originally prepared for a reading course in Public Economics under the guidance of Professor 
Peter Hammond and a June Paper, both part of the Ph D. program in the Economics Department 
at the European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, 1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI). Many 
indispensable discussions with Peter Hammond and Robert Waldmann, IATgX help from Gotz Ro­
ll wer and useful comments from Steve Martin, Alexander Schrader and Chaim Braude are gratefully 
acknowledged. Thanks to Barbara Bonke for having administered the publication of this paper and 
























































































































































































Economists have been thinking about welfare measures since the earliest days of their 
subject. There are at least two parts to the problem: How should one measure in­
dividual welfare? How should one measure social welfare? That both are important 
questions is beyond doubt. Almost every paper in applied economics has a section 
on “welfare implications”, usually leading the authors to make policy recommenda­
tions. Very often these are of limited quality, based on the wrong theoretical welfare 
measure, mixing ordinal and cardinal preference orderings, or reporting individual 
welfare measures that have been, wrongly, applied to aggregate data.
At least theoretically there seems to be, after 120 years or so of thinking, some 
consensus on what the appropriate measures should be — a form of variation, (Hicks’ 
equivalent variation is one example), based on a money metric1. Practically, there 
are still some who argue that the equivalent variation is difficult (or impossible) to 
estimate and that consumer surplus is a good approximation to a theoretically correct 
measure of individual welfare.
Section 1 contains definitions, discusses individual measures of welfare and contrasts 
the Marshallian consumer surplus literature with other, better measures of welfare. 
Section 2 looks at three recent attempts to define a  single measure of social welfare. 
Section 3 links the theoretical considerations to parametric and nonparametric mod­
els and shows how the correct measure can be computed for a range of modelling 
situations.
2 Individual W elfare M easures
2.1 W h a t do  W elfare M easures M easure?
Morey (1984) has forcefully argued that a considerable part of the confusion that 
persists in the welfare measurement literature arises because “people are not explicit 
about whether they believe consumers have cardinal or ordinal preference orderings” 
[Morey (1984), p. 164]2. This paper is concerned with welfare measures, denomi­
nated in Ecus, that correspond to ordinal preference orderings of the consumer. Such
'This assessment might be too optimistic. The controversy over Marshallian Surplus versus Hick- 
sian Measures has seen articles with titles like, “The Plain TVuth about Consumer Surplus” (Mishan 
(1978)), “The Ugly TVuth about Consumer Surplus” [Foster and Neuburger (1978)), “The TVuth 
Plain or Ugly, but the TVuth: A Rejoinder” [Mishan (1978)]. Even if the war is over, the “Confuser 
Surplus” [Morey (1984)] is still with us. For a “provocative” assessment of the public economics 
literature as a whole compare Hammond (1990).
2More recently this view has been emphasised by Gravelle and Wriglesworth (1987); Mishan 




























































































measures contain information about the ranking of different projects by individual 
consumers and how many Ecus each individual is better or worse off. They contain no 
information about the intensity of preference for one project over another. For exam­
ple, if project A, for some individual, yields EculOOO and project B yields Ecu2000 
this does not imply that, to the individual, project A is worth twice as much as 
project B3.
2.2 C onsum er S urp lus
2.2.1 Historical Development
To understand why consumer surplus4 is such an influential and widely used concept 
in economics, it is important to take a brief look at the history of economic thought 
(confusion) in this area. Say (1826)5 stated that “price is the value of things and their 
value the measure of the utility imputed to them” . According to Say, to measure total 
utility, one has to multiply the price times the quantity of commodities purchased. 
Jules Dupuit6 refined Say’s approach. He argued that the observed price does not 
measure the utility of each unit, but only the utility of the last unit purchased. 
According to Dupuit the consumer would be willing to pay pi for i =  1 ... n units, 
where pt > p ,V  i > j ,  for each unit of the commodity. Provided consumption is 
perfectly divisible total utility, according to Dupuit, is defined as the sum of the 
individual prices. The difference between Dupuit’s and Say’s measure is consumer 
surplus (CS).
3Advocates of “welfare measures” that measure cardinal utility, providing a mapping from Ecus 
to utils, sometimes argue that policymakers want to know whether project A is worth twice as 
much as project B to the particular consumer. W hat cardinalists are looking for is a function that 
transforms utils into money, a function of the form M  = o +  bU, where M  is money, U utility, a 
is a constant and b is the inverse of the marginal utility of money, A. For this transformation to 
work, one has to assume constancy of A with respect to prices and income. Samuelson (1942) showed 
that A can not stay constant with respect to both prices and income. A line-integral proof on this 
point has been provided by Silberberg (1972). He concludes, “It would be nice, if there were always 
a  unique one-to-one correspondence between utility changes and money changes ... However, it is 
simply not so” [p. 951].
4Consumer Surplus can have different meanings. For example the entry by Takayama (1987) in 
The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, entitiled “consumer surplus”, covers Marshallian 
Consumer Surplus, Takayama calls it Marshall-Dupuit or M-D measure, and Hicksian compensating 
and equivalent variation, called H-measures. Mishan (1978) too adopts this terminology. In this 
paper consumer surplus stands for Marshallian Consumer Surplus.
‘ Jean-Baptiste Say lived from 1767 to 1832. The quote is taken from the 1880 edition of the 
TVaité d'économie politique, published in English in 1970 by August Kelley Editions in New York. 
In 1826, the Flench original was already in its Aflh edition.
‘ Arséne-Jules-Emile Juvenal Dupuit lived from 1804 to 1866. For a detailed summary of his 




























































































In “Principles or Economics” Marshall (1930) provides the following definition of 
consumer surplus: “We have already seen that the price which a person pays for a 
thing can never exceed, and seldom comes up to that which he would be willing 
to pay rather than go without it: so that the satisfaction which he gets from its 
purchase generally exceeds that which he gives up in paying away its price; and 
he thus derives from the purchase a surplus of satisfaction. The excess of the price 
which he would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which 
he actually does pay, is the economic measure of this surplus satisfaction. It may 
be called consumer’s surplus." [Marshall (1930), page 124, italics in original]. In the 
subsequent paragraph, (§2) Marshall gives the example of a man who makes tea 
purchases for domestic consumption. He gives a ficticious price-demand relationship 
and computes consumer surplus for a number of price levels for the domestically 
consumed, single good. In the next section (§3), Marshall extends the analysis for 
tea to a large market. He chooses “to neglect that the same sum of money represents 
different amounts of pleasure to different people” [Marshall (1930), page 128]. In a 
footnote, Marshall draws the diagram that has become a standard way of illustrating 
consumer’s surplus. Price is measured along the vertical axis, quantitiy along the 
horizontal axis.
Fig. 1.
The straight line DD’ is the demand curve for tea in a large market. At the price 
AH the consumers purchase amount OH. Changing the price to MP, the consumers 
purchase OM. The area DCA is the conumers’ surplus when the price is AH.
Note VI of the Mathematical Appendix gives a formal definition of consumer’s surplus 




























































































/(z ) , where y is the price and x  the quantity demanded7, consumer’s surplus is given 
by an integral
C S  =  [  R x)dx. (1)
The upper bound a is the quantity demanded. The lower bound b is some kind of 
(quantity) subsistence level, below which “/(z )  will be infinite®, or at least indefinitely 
great for values of x  less than 6.”
Marshall himself pointed out some of the limitations and shortcomings of his own 
conept, namely the move from consumer’s surplus to consumers’ surplus, the case 
where more than one good are consumed and income effects. On the first issue Mar­
shall notes that “the real worth of a thing might be discussed with reference not to 
a single person but to people in general; .. . This involves the consideration that a 
pound’s worth of satisfaction to an ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than 
a pound’s worth of satisfaction to an ordinary rich man: ..” [Marshall (1930), page 
130) and “but it would be assumed that such differences between individuals might 
be neglected, since we were considering in either case the average of large numbers 
of people; ..” [ibidem, footnote 2). Marshall optimistically concludes that “... by far 
the greater number of the events with which economics deals, affect in about equal 
proportions all the different classes of society; ... it is on account of this fact that the
’ Marshall wrote and drew the price as a function of the quantity demanded. In the definition of 
contemporary economics, the quantity demandend is a function of prices and income. It is because 
of Marshall that modem economists draw the price as a function of the quantity demanded and 
call it the demand curve, but write the quantity demanded as a function of the price, the way a 
mathematician or physicist would do, and call it the demand function. For example, Gravelle and 
Rees (1981) stipulate that “the consumer’s optimization problem, .., depends on his preferences, the 
prices he faces and his money income. We can write this solution, which we call his demand for goods 
as a function of prices and income |Gravelle and Rees (1981), page 77, italics in original]. However, on 
page 105, the authors draw a demand schedule with price on the vertical axis and quantity demanded 
on the horizontal axis and call it a demand curve. Noboy seems willing to break with tradition and 
draw a graph that corresponds to the demand function; Varian (1984), Cowell (1986), Kreps (1990) 
all draw graphs that correspond to the way Marshall wrote his (inverse) demand functions and not to 
the way they themselves do. Drawing the demand function the Marshall way is not a problem as far 
as the visual property of “downward sloping” is concerned. However, when illustrating consumer’s 
surplus integrals based on today’s definition of the demand function, one might get confused -  either 
one can integrate under today’s inverse demand function and draw consumer’s surplus underneath 
Marshall’s demand curve, or one can integrate today’s demand function proper and draw CS to the 
left of Marshall's demand function. Obtaining the correct sign is yet another complication. It might 
be altogether easier to break with tradition and start drawing diagrams with the quantity demanded 
on the vertical axis.




























































































exact measurement of the consumers’ surplus in a market has already much theoret­
ical interest, and may become of high practical importance.” [opus cit., page 131J. 
Marshall was more pessimistic about the aggregation of goods. In Mathematical Note 
VII he writes, “if we could find a plan for grouping together in one common demand 
curve all those things which satify the same wants and are rivals; and also for every 
group of this of which the services are complementary [total utility of income could 
be represented by £  /k“ f(x)dx\. But we cannot do this: and therefore the formula 
remains a mere general expression, having no practical application.”9. On the issue 
of income effects, Marshall was more optimistic again. Towards the end of Mathemat­
ical Note VI (page 842) he concludes that “if it be desirable to take account of the 
influence which his expenditure [the consumer’s] on tea exerts on the value of money 
to him, it is only necessary to multiply [the quantity demanded] by the amount which 
he has already spent on tea which represents the marginal utility of money when his 
stock of it has been diminished by that amount.” Overall it appears that Marshall 
saw consumers’ surplus as an intelligent theoretical vehicle and as useful in practice; 
many applications of the concept in later chapters of his “Principles” may serve as 
evidence10.
There are additional weaknesses; one, CS is defined in terms of the inverse demand 
function (see footnote). Two, Marshall assumed that his inverse demand functions 
were strictly independent of each other. Although this satisfies the integrability con­
ditions, it is an overly restrictive assumption.
The current definition of CS is for a single consumer, a single price change and 
commodities Xi, i =  1,2, ..,n, with nominal prices P = (p\,P2 ... Pn)- The demand 
function for the ith good is given by x t =  X j( P ,  Y) where Y  is the consumer’s nominal 
income. Instead of Marshall’s quantities a and b consider the initial situation Q° = 
(P°,Y°) and the subsequent situation Q1 = (P 1, V1). According to Takayama (1987) 
in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics “Marshall (1920) argued that the 
welfare impact on the consumer can be measured by the trapezoid to the left of 
the demand curve Xi(Pi, P ? ,..., f j ,  T°) formed by the given price change. The is 
the famous concept of consumer surplus by Marshall.” It should be evident that 
this is not what Marshall originally had in mind11; once again the confusion arises
‘ Applied economists who estimate demand systems perform this kind of grouping already a t the 
pre-estimation stage. Hence, it is hardly surprising that most of them do not consider Marshall’s 
original objection when they get to the stage of computing consumer’s surplus.
‘‘ Marshall also used consumer surplus arguments when he analysed the British postal monopoly. 
Indeed, he estimated the loss in consumers’ surplus from the monopoly, as opposed to having a 
competitive, private postal service, at L4.5m for the mid-1880’s; compare Albon (1989) for a critical 
evaluation of Marshall’s work.
“ In Chapter XIII of his Principles, Marshall (1930) discusses the effects of taxation and bounties 





























































































from Marshall’s use of the inverse demand function. Returning to integrals, today’s 
definition integrates the area to the left of demand curve (drawn the Marshall way), 
bounded by the price vectors P° and P l. For a single price change, the integral is 
given by
where Pf < P,1, the original price is smaller than the final price for the first good and 
the prices of all other goods and income are held constant. In terms of Figure 1, this 
would correspond to a price change from CA to EP and (a change in) consumer’s 
surplus of CEPA. An extension to multiple price changes, can be found in Silberberg
2.2.2 Consumer Surplus: A Measure of Individual Welfare ?
As was argued before, and accepting the important value judgement, that “what the 
consumer prefers is better”12, a “good economic” welfare indicator must be judged 
by whether or not it accurately reflects consumers’ preferences.
Chipman and Moore (1976,80) have laid down such conditions for consumer surplus. 
In technical terms, they ask “what properties must be satisfied by a vector valued 
( (n + 1) -  component) function /(p , I) of variable prices p =  (pi-.-Pn) and income I  in 
order that the line integral of this function over the space of price income pairs (p, I) 
connecting an initial point (pb,/o) and a terminal point (p i,/i)  correctly measures 
the change in a consumer’s utility as between these two situations?”
They show, first, that when the first r» components of /(p , I) are restricted to be func­
tions of prices alone, consumer surplus cannot represent the underlying preferences 
unless these are homothetic13. Second, they demonstrate that when the last (n—1 )+ 1 
components of /(p , I) are restricted to be functions of prices alone, preferences must 
be parallel14. Parallel preferences have the peculiar property that, for any fixed vector 
of prices p, increases in income are entirely spent on the first commodity.
u This assumption is generally referred to as “consumer sovereignty” . Although a  drug addict 
might prefer more drugs, they do not necessarily increase his/her welfare. Indeed, it might be 
welfare improving for society patemalistically to discourage their use — as is indeed the case in 
most countries.
13Recall that a preference relation R  is homothetic if x 'f tx 2 iff Ax1/?Ax2 for A >  0. Changing 
both quantities x i and x j by a factor A does not change the consumer’s preference for xi over xj.
14Utility functions that correspond to parallel preferences generate income-expansion paths that 
are straight lines parallel to the axis of the first commodity. For a formal definition and a diagram 
compare Chipman and Moore (1976), equation (2.70) or Chipman and Moore (1980), [p. 937). A 






























































































The results of Chipman and Moore confirm and complete those of Samuelson (1942) 
and show that for the case of homothetic preferences, marginal utility must be inde­
pendent of prices and, in the case of parallel preferences, independent of income and 
of all prices other than that of commodity 1. Clearly, these requirements are very 
restrictive. Indeed they are so restrictive that they rule out consumer surplus as a 
credible indicator of individual economic welfare.
2.2.3 Consumer Surplus: A Good Approximation?
Willig (1976) admits that CS is not the correct theoretical welfare measure, but 
argues that it is so “close” to the correct measures that the approximation errors are 
negligible when compared to the standard errors from estimating demand functions. 
To illustrate this point, he reports the results of simulations for a range of parameter 
values on the income elasticity and the ratio of consumer surplus relative to base 
income, something he defines as “a measure of the proportional change in real income 
due to a price change.”
Hausman (1981) convincingly demolishes Willig’s case15. He shows that,
-  For a single price change no approximation is necessary because exact measures 
can be calculated straightforwardly16.
-  If the loss of income resulting from the price change is large, relative to the 
original level of income, the approximation error becomes very large17.
-  The theoretically correct measures of deadweight loss are badly distorted, even 
when Willig’s results hold18.
Why approximate the correct measures using Consumer Surplus. If approximations 
have to be made, they can be made directly; such techniques have been provided by 
McKenzie and Pearce (1976), McKenzie (1982) and Hammond (1988).
“ Hausman's work is very similar to Markandya (1978), who cites Willig but does not criticise 
him directly. McKenzie (1979) had already tried to demolish Willig's case; for a reply see Willig 
(1979).
16As will be argued later, and in Section 3, this is also possible for more than one price change. 
lrBaldry (1988) has shown that with a CES utility function that allows for the withdrawal of 
one good (zero quantity), even the errors as measured by Willig can become large; he considers a 
special case that illustrates the dangers of confining oneself to the analysis of single price changes. 
(Yet) another paper that compares differences between CS and compensating variations is Johnson 
(1985).
“ Hausman made a mistake in his numerical example of female labour supply that was meant to 
illustrate this point. This was corrected by Haveman, Garley and Andreoni (1987). There is also a 





























































































2.3 T h eo re tica lly  E xac t M easures
Unlike consumer surplus, the measures that will be presented in this section are 
constructed from consumers’ preferences. Hence, the question is not whether they 
accurately represent those preferences, as in the case of the CS, but whether they can 
be calculated from a set of ordinary demand functions.
McKenzie (1983), (chapter 2) shows how to construct theoretically correct measures 
based on consumer preferences. First he expresses a particular class of utility func­
tions in terms of a cost of utility (expenditure function), which he then uses to derive 
a money metric, or equivalence function, and a related compensation function. The 
money metric is very intuitive, because it maps money values to a preference order­
ing. McKenzie uses the money metric to define two measures of individual welfare, 
Hicksian equivalent variation (EV) and compensating variation (CV)1®. As it turns 
out, only the equivalent variation is an ordinal money metric measure of individual 
welfare. As Chipman and Moore (1980) show, compensating variation is an ordinal 
money metric only under the assumption that preferences are homothetic30.
McKenzie also discusses the move from consumer preferences to ordinary demand 
functions and vice versa. Whilst the former is standard textbook material, the latter 
involves solving differential equations by means of an integrating factor. However, 
having derived the demand functions from specific parametric classes of utility func­
tions, as McKenzie does, it must be true that an integrating factor exists that solves 
the differential equation.
Although interesting, McKenzie’s methodology is not of great practical interest. When 
the equivalence class of ordinal utility functions is known, as he implicitly assumes, the 
task of deriving an exact measure of economic welfare become a mere mathematical 
exercise. The whole discussion about integrating factors might suggest that McKenzie 
follows a “revealed preference” approach, while, in fact, he is not. *20
‘®The equivalent and compensating variations are due to Hicks (1946) and Hicks (1956). For 
excellent textbook treatments of CV and EV see Varian (1984), [page 264], Cowell (1986), [pp. 81] 
and Gravelle and Rees (1981), [pp. 103]. As a reminder, let m°, p°, u° denote income, price and 
utility before and m 1 .p 1, ti1 after the change; then, in terms of the expenditure function, E V  =  
E (p°,u l ) -  m° and C V  = m 1 -  £ (p ‘ ,u°).
20 A dear summary of these issues, as well as cardinal versus ordinal preferences was provided by 
Gravelle and Wrigiesworth (1987). They also show that C V  always satisfies the weaker requirement 
of completeness; the measure must be able to indicate the sign of the change, no more. Intuitively, the 
compensating variation is not a representation of a consumer’s ordinal preference ordering, because 
final prices vary as the final allocation varies. Kay (1980) and King (1983) were aware of this point
when trying to measure the welfare effects of tax reform; “But measures based on compensating
variation employ a different reference price vector for each reform. Hence the money value of the 
gain from reform A cannot be compared with the money value of the gain horn reform B because




























































































Hausman (1981), Vartia (1983) and Hammond (1990) have shown that, in principle, 
theoretically correct measures of individual welfare can be defined and calculated, 
even when the ordinal class of utility function is not known. In a way, they turn the 
problem upside down. Instead of specifying a particular family of utility functions, like 
McKenzie, and estimating the resulting demand system, they first consider the market 
demand function and then go back to recover the corresponding welfare measures. 
They never need to specify a utility function; all they need to show is that the 
estimated demand function does indeed correspond to a preference ordering for the 
consumer.
Markandya (1978) and Hausman (1981) focus on the integrability of demand func­
tions by looking at the case of a single price change. Both consider some quite general 
specifications of single demand relations that can be integrated analytically. However, 
their treatment is incomplete. Even for a single price change, analysing single demand 
equations is only legitimate when the underlying utility functions are separable be­
tween the good whose price changes and the other goods. Additionally, the existence 
of a solution to the differential equations is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition 
for the demand functions to correspond to a preference ordering for the consumer. 
Furthermore, Hausman defines his exact welfare measures in terms of the expendi­
ture function. As Hammond (1990) points out, this is not always correct, because the 
expenditure function might not have an inverse, — but only a boundary problem.
Vartia (1983) extends Markandya’s and Hausman’s results. He deals with more than 
one price change and addresses the integrability problem in a rigorous manner. Also, 
he gives some programmable algorithms to solve the more complicated differential 
equations. In particular, Vartia shows that when a set of ordinary demand functions 
satisfies the “Direct Utility Hypothesis”, the compensated demand functions can be 
recovered by solving a first order nonlinear differential equation. The compensated 
demand functions are used to construct price indices of the Paasche type and quantity 
indices of the Laspeyres type. Although his paper is more general than Markanya’s 
and Hausman’s, Vartia’s main interest are price indices and not welfare measures.
Hammond (1990) generalises the previous results. Although the paper starts with 
a discussion of preferences and ends with demand functions, it takes exactly the 
“revealed preference” (as opposed to the “known preferences”?) approach. There are 
a number of important features that distinguish it from previous attempts. First, two 
kinds of good are considered, traded goods x, that correspond to the usual definitions 
and untraded goods z, that include public goods. This is important, because it allows 
one to properly define the set of exogenous variables. Thus the change considered 
goes from initial values (po,mo,Zo) to final value (pi,mi,Zi), where p are the prices 
of the traded goods and m  money. Second, there is a clear definition of the money 




























































































the money metric indirect utility function that is used to define general variation in 
money metric utility. This rules out the case where the indirect utility function is 
not invertible, the expenditure function does not represent consumers’ preferences, 
and welfare measures based on the expenditure function fail. Fourth, there is a clear 
derivation of Hicks’ compensating and equivalent variation as special cases of the 
general variation. It becomes evident how and why they differ and why equivalent 
variation is the preferred measure. Fifth, there is a distinction between small changes 
and large changes in the money metric measure of individual welfare. While the case of 
small changes is (relatively) straightforward, large changes require the construction of 
an income compensation function, the very construct the consumer surplus approach 
is lacking. Assuming a continuously differentiable path (p(t),z(t)) (0 < t <  1), the 
money metric measure of the change from (po,mo,Zo) to (p i.m ^zi) with respect to 
an arbitrary reference point (pn, z r ) can be found by solving an ordinary differential 
equation in m(t). This is an important result, since there exist a large number of 
efficient algorithms for solving ordinary differential equations. Sixth, exact conditions 
are laid down for the demand and willingness to pay functions (consumers’ marginal 
willingness to pay for a change in z) to correspond to a preference ordering21. This 
part is crucial for the “upside down” approach adopted for the welfare measurement 
problem. Finding a solution to the ordinary differential equation in m{t) is not enough 
for the individual welfare measures to correspond to a consumer’s preference ordering. 
As a separate point, Hammond also discusses the case, appropriately baptised a 
“personal catastrophe”, where the welfare measures are not defined. The change from 
(po,mo,Zo) to (pi,m i,Zi) is so dramatic for the consumer that one could never hope 
to compensate with a finite amount of money22.
2.4 W h a t M easure?
This section has defined welfare measures as constructs that can rank all possible 
price and income combinations before and after a change according to an individual’s 
preferences. This includes the secondary, but important assumption that what the 
consumer wants is better (“consumer sovereignty”). In the terminology of Gravelle 
and Wriglesworth (1987) these welfare measures have the ordinality property23. A 
narrow definition of the term “welfare measure” helps to avoid a large part of the
’ 'Another reference here is Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971).
’’ Actually, a “personal miracle” is also possible. The consumer is so well oil that one could never 
hope to bring him/her back to earth with a finite withdrawl of money; compare Fortune magazine 
for examples.
’’ Some surplus measure S has the ordinality property “for all possible proposed pairs of price and 
income combinations (p1, y*), (p’ ,y ’ ), and for any intitial combination (p°, y°): S (0 ,2) > (< )S (0,1) 
if and only if v(p’ ,y ’ ) > (< )v (p ',y ') ” [Gravelle and Wriglesworth (1987), p. 233], where v(p,y) is 




























































































controversy over Marshallian Consumer surplus arising from a general confusion be­
tween the concepts of ordinal and cardinal utility. Also, it defines theoretically exact 
welfare measures — as measures that rank alternatives according to the consumers’ 





Ordinal ity No Homothetic Homothetic or Parallel
restrictions Preferences Preferences
(with add. restrictions)
Hause (1975) Chipman & Moore (1980) Chipman & Moore (1976)
(Mis)uses of consumer surplus and compensating variation for measuring welfare come 
in various degrees. A large group of applied work simply ignores all theoretical consid­
erations, estimates demand equations and conducts “welfare analysis” , unashamedly, 
in terms of consumer surplus25. A particularly striking example are Smith and Kaoru 
(1990) who use “Meta-Analysis”26 applied to a sample of 200 published and unpub­
lished studies of recreational demand over the period 1970 to 1986. They find that 77 
of the 200 used consumer surplus estimates or sufficient information to derive them, 
— as they do27. A second group of empirical studies follow Willig (1976) and report 
compensating variations approximated by estimates of consumer surplus. A typical 
example is a study of the distributional impact of gasoline conservation policies by 
Archibald and Gillingham (1982) who use a short panel data set to estimate an indi­
vidual specific translog demand system. For two tax reforms (a fifty percent increase 
in gasoline taxation and the introduction of a coupon scheme) they compute Willig’s 
consumer surplus approximation to the compensating variation for each household.
of welfare measures see Ebert (1984). Ebert calls ordinality the correct ranking property; his article 
also covers welfare indices.
24 Adapted from a table in Gravelle and Wriglesworth (1987), p. 247.
25 A CD-ROM search of abstracts appearing in the Journal of Economic Literature revealed that 
the American Journal of Agricultural Economics (19 articles), the American Economic Review (16), 
the Journal of Political Economy (7), Land Economics (7), the Southern Economic Journal (6), the 
International Economic Review (6) and some others are full of applied and theoretical work on and 
using consumer surplus as a form of “welfare measure” . The search command was “CONSUM* AND 
SURPLUS” . This yields 199 references. Excluding books, this leaves 185 journal articles, including 
comments and replies. Of course, the search also includes articles that explicitly reject consumer 
surplus. However, since these are few, I preferred to report the “raw” counts.
26“Meta-Analysis” , crudely defined, are techniques that derive statistical results from more than 
one data set or statistically similar studies that are based on different data sets (and samples); for 
a rigorous introduction see Rosenthal (1991).
27In industrial economics, the influential work of Schmalensee (1981) on the welfare effects of 
price discrimination has lead to a string of empirical work that uses consumer surplus estimates to 




























































































The approach and conclusions of Willig (1976) seem to be the consensus in industrial 
economics. In one of the standard textbooks on industrial economics, Tirole (1988) 
postulates that “The goods and industries considered in this book generally represent 
only a small share of consumer expenditure. Price changes are therefore likely to 
generate small income effects, and it may be appropriate to assume that demand is 
downward sloping and that the consumer surplus is a good approximation of welfare.” 
[Tirole (1988), p .ll, italics not in originalJ.
A third strand of the literature has followed Hausman (1981)28 in estimating a single 
demand equation and deriving the expenditure function via Roy's identity29. These 
applications also tend to follow Hausman’s example in deriving compensating varia­
tion rather than equivalent variation, the correct welfare measure30. Very few empir­
ical studies have implemented the theoretically correct measures. Morey (1985) has 
estimated ranges of individual equivalent (and compensating) variation from the de­
mand for a Colorado ski area, but does not seem to worry much about the differences 
between EV and CV. King (1983) comes closest to the requirements of economic 
theory. He analyses the welfare implications of tax reform by estimating ranges of 
individual equivalent variations and reports his results with standard errors31.
In practice, a number of important problems remain. It is not clear how one can define 
goods that include the public environment, and, more problematically, get data for 
estimating willingness to pay functions. What is the most appropriate statistical 
technique and what demand systems can one hope to estimate in practice? How can 
one ensure that the integrability conditions hold and solve the system of differential 
equations? Is it possible to solve differential equations that have discontinuous or 
multivalued right hand sides, as in discrete choice situations? Applied economists 
have worked on most of these questions. The results appear incomplete and often
"M arkandya (1978) is usually not cited.
" T h e  authors usually use the functional forms and solutions provided in Hausman (1981).
"H ausm an mentions EV in a footnote of his survey article on labour supply in the Handbook 
of Pubkc Economic). He writes: “The alternative measure [to CV) of the equivalent variation uses 
poet-tax utility U' as the basis for measuring welfare loss. For labor supply in the two-good set-up, 
the equivalent variation typically gives a higher measure of welfare loss than does the compensating 
variation.” When considering his measure of deadweight loss, based on CV, he goes on to argue: 
“Here we follow Diamond and McFadden (1974) and use taxes raised at the compensated point. 
Kay (1980) has recently argued in favor of using the uncompensated point. As with CV and EV 
measures the problem is essentially one of which is the better index number basis.” [Hausman 
(1985), footnotes 44, 45, p. 244). Regarding the second remarks, even if one ignores all theoretical 
considerations, Pauwels (1986) has shown that all deadweight loss measures based on compensating 
variations are unreliable.
3>King (1983) actually derives equivalent gains; equivalent gain and equivalent variation are es­
sentially the same measure. Table 2 (p. 205) reports the distribution of equivalent gains by decile 
of original equivalent income, including the standard errors of mean equivalent gain; an extensive 




























































































scattered through various literatures. Section 3 provides an outline of some of the 
econometric issues involved.
To conclude, Marshallian consumer surplus is not a good measure of individual eco­
nomic welfare. It reflects very special, unrealistic types of consumer preferences and 
completely ignores the income effects of a price change. It very rarely provides a good 
approximation to the correct theoretical measures, although these can be calculated 
without great difficulty.
3 Social Welfare M easures
As could be seen the measurement of individual welfare is difficult — the measurement 
of welfare for society as a whole is even more difficult. Actually, it is not immediately 
obvious why one wishes to calculate a single social welfare measure at all. After 
all, when considering a policy change the crucial question is: Who gains, who loses? 
How significant are the gains, how significant are the losses? Why not simply report 
the distribution of the individual welfare measures and leave it at that? Given the 
information on the individual gains and losses, everybody can calculate his or her 
own social welfare measure [compare Hammond (1990)]. However, things are not 
that simple. There is some advantage in having a single measure when comparing 
two rival policies, at least as long as the assumptions underlying the construction of 
the social welfare function are spelt out clearly.
King (1983) considers both cases. For a hypothetical tax reform in the U.K., he 
calculates and reports a variety of statistics on the distribution of gains and losses 
in his sample population. In particular, he compares the distribution of “equivalent 
gain”, his individual welfare measure, with “cash gains” , a measure the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer likes to use in his budget speech. On the other hand, he is keen 
on calculating the “social value” of the reform, an overall measure based on a social 
welfare function. In the following, five different approaches to calculating the “social 
value” in terms of a money metric will be considered.
As before, it must be stressed that all the money metric measures presented assume 
“consumer sovereignty”. However, unlike in the case of individual welfare measures, 
here it is assumed that “what the consumer prefers” is not only better for her or him, 
but for society as a whole.
3.1 A dd itive  M oney M etric  U tility
Harberger (1971) in his “open letter to the profession” pronounces “Three Basic 




























































































(a) the competitive demand price for a given unit measures the value of that unit 
to the demander;
(b) the competitive supply price for a given unit measures the value of that unit to 
the supplier;
(c) when evaluating the net benefits of costs of a given action (project, program, or 
policy), the costs and benefits accruing to each member of the relevant group 
(e.g. a nation) should normally be added without regard to the individuals) to 
whom they accrue.
(Harberger (1971), page 785, italics not in original]
Harberger recommends adding up individual consumer surplus measures. Why the 
consumer surplus is not the correct measure of individual welfare was discussed in 
the previous section. The question here is a different one: is it legitimate to sum up 
individual welfare measures?
Hammond (1990, page 16) clarifies Harberger’s implicit assumptions. In particular, 
if Harberger’s assertions are to have any meaning at all, the price vector must be the 
same for all members of society. Furthermore, in the reference situation the additive 
money metric measure Harberger suggests is equal to the total level of unearned 
income. Both are strong assumptions. More seriously, Harberger’s measure completely 
ignores any concern for distributional'Justice. In effect, what he proposes is a social 
welfare function with all weights equal to one.
Kaldor and Hicks proposed a measure like Harberger’s as a compensation test of 
potential welfare improvements32. Proponents of compensation tests might argue that 
summing individual equivalent or compensating variations {EVit CVi) gives a  rough 
summary indicator and when the sum of the individual variations is larger than zero 
(5Z EVi > 0 or £  CVi >  0) a project might be potentially Pareto improving. Boadway 
(1974), [pp. 932-4] has shown that summing CVs provides necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for accepting or rejecting the Kaldor-Hicks tests. Ng (1979), [pp. 97] calls 
this the Boadway paradox33. However, as Hammond (1979,87) shows, the lump sum 
redistributions required for this kind of test to serve as a signal of a potential true
MThe Kaldor test redistributes from those who gain to those who lose from a change, after it has 
taken place. If the gainers can fully compensate the lasers and still remain better off, the change 
passes the Kaldor test. The Hickt test asks if the potential losers could (or should) compensate the 
potential gainers, prevent the change and remain better off than if the change had actually taken 
place. If the losers could (or should), the potential change passes the Hicks test; compare Boadway 
and Bruce (1984), pp. 263.
MIn contrast, Dierker and Lenninghaus (1986) have shown that, if the consumption possibility 




























































































improvement are not incentive compatible. Therefore, since the Kaldor-Hicks tests 
are theoretically flawed in the first place, one need not be too concerned about the 
paradox (or the absence of the paradox)34.
Judge Posner (1981), a former Professor in the Chicago Law School, now a U.S. 
Federal Judge and one of the founders of the “law and economics” movement in the 
U.S., has reiterated Harberger’s suggestion. However, while Harberger’s justification 
for adding up consumer surplus measures was for, what he felt, important practical 
reasons [Harberger (1971), II], Posner justifies his claim on ethical grounds. What he 
effectively argues is that money should be treated equally, not people.
3.2 M oney M etric  M easures o f “Social V alue”
3.2.1 Additive Money Metric Utility with Distributional Weights
Harberger (1978) to some extent retracted from his original (1971) stance and sug­
gested multiplying individual welfare measures by distributional weights that vary 
inversely with income35.
However in section VI. he is careful to point out that “when distributional weights 
are used ... the result is to open the door to projects and programs whose degree of 
inefficiency by more traditional (unweighted) cost-benefit measures would (I feel con­
fident) be unacceptable to the vast majority of economists and the informed public.” 
[Harberger (1978), p. 113]. As an illustration, Harberger sends ice-cream from a rich 
oasis to a poorer one, through the desert, on the back of a camel. In two different 
calibrations that both pass the distributionally weighted test, he finds that | t h  and 
g th  of the ice-cream would melt on the way. His remarks seem to suggest that he 
would prefer to let the poor oasis go without ice-cream (or bread?).
Unfortunately, Harberger overlooks an important aspect of weighting in the social 
welfare function. Apart from very small projects, the policy change will change the 
income distribution. Hence, Harberger’s distributional weights are not the same before 
and after the change. Indeed, a desirable policy is very likely to move, or should move, 
a substantial part of the households at the lower end of the distribution to a higher 
quantile.
34This point was forcefully argued in Hammond (1990), [p. 17).
“ ’’There can be no doubt that distributional weights (particularly weights which vary inversely 





























































































Poliak (1981) constructed a “social cost of living index” by defining an indirect social 
welfare function, a kind of indirect utility function for society, and a corresponding 
social expenditure function. The social expenditure function has been used by Jor­
genson, Lau and Stoker (1981), Jorgenson and Slesnick (1983,84,90) and Jorgenson 
(1990) to construct specific indices of social welfare, which they employ empirically 
to investigate issues of inequality and efficiency in the U.S. after the Second World 
War.
Poliak starts by considering an investigator’s preference relation R and a correspond­
ing social welfare function W(x), “where \  =  (X i,X 2, .....Xs) is the n x S  dimen­
sional ‘social consumption vector’ showing each household’s consumption of every 
good.” [Poliak (1981), page 314] By assuming “consumer sovereignty” this social wel­
fare function can be written as W(x) =  fl[f/i(Xi)....... . Us(Xs)\, where (/, is the ith
household’s utility function.
The crucial idea behind Poliak’s approach is to define the indirect social welfare func­
tion A (P ,pi,...,/i.) =  n [> k i(P ,p i) ,4 ',(P ,p ,) ] . The maximum value of the indirect 
social welfare function “is the maximum ‘social utility’ attainable in the price situa­
tion P when the distribution of expenditure among households is given by (/ij, ...,p,). 
The social expenditure function is defined as the minimum expenditure required to at­
tain each indifference curve of the social welfare function at prices P." [Poliak (1981), 
pp. 314-315). The indirect social welfare function and the social expenditure function 
are equivalent to a single consumer’s indirect utility and expenditure function.
Jorgenson and Slesnick extend Poliak’s work by considering a particular functional 
form for W(x), the Samuelson-Bergson social welfare function, which they go on 
to estimate. It is the social expenditure function that allows them to express the 
social welfare function in monetary values. Jorgenson and Slesnick make a number 
of assumptions regarding their consumers’ preferences and the social orderings they 
build into W(x). To facilitate comparisions, they use the axiomatic framework for 
social choice found, for example, in Roberts (1980). For the consumer, they take a 
trans-log indirect utility function to represent preferences, impose Lau’s (1982) exact 
aggregation conditions, and take the household as the basic consuming unit. Further­
more, they put commodities into five more or less arbitrary groups and attribute five 
demographic characteristics to each household.
Technically, they express their social welfare function as the sum of a term that 
measures the average of individual welfare levels over all consuming units and a sec­
ond term, that represents the individual diversions from the average. Their function 
is homogeneous of degree one in individual welfare [cf. Roberts (1980)]. A number 
of parameters allow them to shape the function, so as to incorporate quantitative




























































































value judgements. An example is the function p(x) < — 1, the degree of aversion to 
inequality; x  is a matrix describing the social state.
Jorgenson and Slesnick define four indices, which Jorgenson (1990) uses to assess 
the impact of changes in the price system and the distribution of total expenditure 
{M*}36 on the standard of living, equity and efficiency for the U.S. economy.
A standard of living index, Qa (po, W0, Wi ), compares two levels of aggregate expen­
diture per capita, it is a quantity index of social welfare. It is found by evaluating 
Poliak’s social expenditure function for: (i) a base price system po and a base level 
of social welfare W0; (ii) the base price system po and the current level of social wel­
fare Wi- The base level of social welfare Wo is found by evaluating the social welfare 
function at po and the base period distribution of total expenditure {M*.0} and Wi 
is found by evaluating the social welfare function for the current price system pi and 
the current distribution of expenditure {A/*1}. Using the social expenditure function 
they obtain from the trans-log indirect utility function, In Qa becomes the translog 
social standard of living index. It posses convenient dimensions; when actual social 
welfare has increased it is larger than zero, when actual welfare has decreased it is 
smaller than zero.
The quantity index of efficiency, Qp{p°, W2, W3) is the ratio of Poliak’s expenditure 
function evaluated at prices po and the maximum level of welfare W3, divided by 
the social expenditure required to attain the potential level of social welfare W2 at 
base prices p°. The maximum level of welfare W3 is the maximum level of welfare 
that can be attained through lump-sum transfers of aggregate total expenditure. 
The maximum level of welfare W3 is an important concept in the methodology of 
Jorgenson and Slesnick, since they take it as a measure of efficiency. Again, using the 
translog indirect utility function; In Qp(p°, W2, W3) is the translog efficiency index. 
A value larger than zero indicates that “potential social welfare” has increased.
The quantity index of equity, Qe is defined as the ratio of the quantity index of social 
welfare and the quantity index of efficiency.
<?£ (P ° ,W 0,W 1,W 2,W 3) =
Qa (jP ,W °,W ») 
CMp°,W2,W 3) (3)
Again-, using the trans-log utility function, In Qe becomes the translog equity index. 
When the index is larger than zero, equity, supposedly, has increased.
The social cost of living index, P  is defined as the social expenditure function eval­
uated at current prices p° and maximum level of welfare W3 divided by the social 
expenditure function evaluated at base prices p° and, again, the maximum level of 
welfare W3. Hence, it is the ratio of the level of expenditure required to attain W3




























































































at current prices and the level of expenditure required to attain the same level of 
welfare at base prices.
M (p ‘ ,W 3)
M (jP,W 3) (4)
The log of P  is defined as the translog social cost of living index which is the translog 
version of Poliak’s index. As Jorgenson points out, since the index only depends on 
the maximum level of welfare W 3, it does not vary with the degree of aversion to 
inequality r. When InP  is greater than zero and aggregate expenditure is constant, 
social welfare is decreased by moving from p° to p1.
Jorgenson and Slesnick compare these to indices that are defined in terms of real 
expenditure per person. For example, they compare the rate of growth in the translog 
social cost of living index to the Consumer Price Index defined by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and obtain a measure of bias in the C.P.I.
There are a number of objections to the Jorgenson and Slesnick approach. As Ham­
mond (1990) points out, their social welfare measure InP  requires non-local infor­
mation, even for small changes. This is due to the definition of P  in terms of W 3. 
It seems very hard to move from the actual income distribution to their optimal 
distribution, even for small changes. In addition, the effort to define W 3 includes 
optimal redistribution via lump-sum transfers and thus poses serious incentive com­
patibility problems [Hammond (1979), Hammond (1987)). Furthermore, the welfare 
measures they obtain are hard to interpret since they are defined in terms of an 
optimal income distribution. However, they do make clear the value judgements, by 
incorporating them properly in the Samuelson-Bergson welfare function. Also, to be 
fair, Jorgenson and Slesnick were not concerned with evaluating projects, but with 
analyzing inequality and measuring national income.
Regarding the empirical aspect, the translog demand system they estimate suffers 
from the shortcomings discussed for individual welfare measures. It is not really sat­
isfactory to impose a particular type of utility function, and corresponding demand 
function, on the data. Jorgenson and Slesnick recover individual demands from ag­
gregate data by appealing to the aggregation properties of their system. One should 
test exact aggregation, not assume it.
3.2.3 ’’Individualised” Weighted Social Welfare Functions
Sen (1982) has tried to compare the level of retd national income for different count­
ries37. Obviously this means comparing different groups. To Sen it was important
3TThe approach described here was first suggested in Sen (1976) and Sen (1979); it is briefly 




























































































to make welfare comparisons. To do this, he started from the idea of “personalized 
commodities” -  the same commodities in the possession of two different people are 
two different goods. This allowed him to define individualised welfare weighted prices, 
which form the basis of his welfare comparisons. In effect, he makes society one big 
consumer, making it possible to apply individual welfare measures. Sen avoids the 
problem implicit in Harberger’s weighting. As the projects considered change the 
income distribution, the weights change. Hence, someone who has been moved up the 
scale by the project subsequently has a lower welfare weight attached.
Sen’s approach is not very intuitive. In particular the value of the measures he obtains 
is hard to interpret; they are in terms of “welfare weighted money”. Hammond (1988), 
appendix) considers how to calculate these measures. However, his methods only 
provide approximations, although is is possible to devise “welfare weighted” versions 
of Vartias’ methods.
3.3 U niform  M oney M etric  o f Social W elfare
Uniform Money Metric Measures are closely related to the “uniformly distributed 
dollars” (UDD) used in Feldstein (1974) and Rosen (1976)38. Hammond (1990) has 
suggested a social welfare measure which shares many of the advantages of the in­
dividual measures he proposed. It is based on the idea of a uniform poll subsidy (or 
tax) that would produce the same effect on social welfare as the project considered.
In Section 3.2 of that paper, a direct social welfare function of Paretian form and a 
corresponding indirect social welfare function are introduced. The variables x, traded 
goods, z, untraded goods and m, money income, are redefined over a finite set of 
individuals I. Section 3.3 recasts Jorgenson and Slesnick in terms of money metric 
functions; the total money metric direct utility function and the total money metric 
indirect utility function. The limitations of their measure become very clear39.
Section 3.4 introduces the indirect uniform money metric social welfare function 
[i(p, m; z) which is central to the paper. To define the money metric, several reference 
vectors must be kept fixed; here these are a reference price vector pR, some reference 
exogenous interpersonal profile of quantity vector zR and a reference income distribu­
tion, m R of unearned incomes. Hammond’s measure considers “the level of uniform
"R osen asked: “If, for example, we find that the ratio of W (the social welfare function] under 
regime A to that in tax regime B is 1.01, how much better is A than B? In order to interpret such a 
change in the welfare index, it is useful to translate it into an equivalent change in family incomes. 
Perhaps the most natural way to accomplish this is to determine how many uniformly distributed 
dollars (UDD) are necessary to raise welfare in B by one percent.”
"Jorgenson and Slesnick’s index In P  has the same level of social welfare, W 3, in the numerator 




























































































poll subsidy which, if given to all individuals in the reference situation (pR, m R, zR), 
would yield the same level of social welfare.”
Formally, p(p, m; z) is the (unique) solution to the equation
V'(p*,mfl +  p (p ,m ;z )l;z fl) =  V(p, m ;z) (5)
where 1 represents a vector of ones and V(p, m ;z) is the indirect social welfare 
function. Starting from a reference vector where only (p, z) are at their reference 
values (pfi,zR), but the income distribution takes the value m* + trl, where a is the 
before mentioned uniform net poll subsidy, then p(pR, m; zR) =  a.
Section 3.5 defines a corresponding measures of welfare change. For a change in 
the exogenous variables from initial values (p°,m°,z°) to final values (p1, m 1, z1), a 
measure of welfare change is the uniform variation in money metric social welfare.
(p‘,m V )- /* (p ° ,m ° ;z 0) (6)
Like in the individual case, this allows one to define the unijorm equivalent variation 
(UEV) and uniform compensating variation (UCV).
The rest of the paper follows the discussion on individual welfare measures. Is it 
possible to recover the uniform money metric social welfare function from a set of 
ordinary demand equations without spelling out an exact functional form for the 
social welfare function? Which conditions must be imposed on the demand system to 
correspond to a preference ordering for all the consumers in the society? Again, the 
solution lies in solving a differential equation, albeit the integrability conditions tire 
somewhat different then in the case of the individual consumer40.
Hammond’s measure has all the advantages of his individual measures and, also, it 
does not suffer from the redistribution problems of Jorgenson and Slesnick. It can be 
calculated from the current income distribution in the reference vector and therefore 
does not suffer from “first best illusion”. At worst, it is not the most intuitive measure 
one could hope for, but maybe this is due to the use of the money metric, rather than 
to the idea of poll subsidies in particular. Indeed, some alternatives are suggested in 
the conclusion of Hammond (1990).
40The integrability conditions differ from the familiar ones in, for example in Varian (1984), 





























































































4.1 P a ra m e tr ic  E stim atio n  of E xact W elfare M easures
The estimation of welfare measures is a cornerstone in the evaluation of large projects, 
for example tax reform. The parametric approach to evaluating tax reform was pi­
oneered by Rosen (1976) and King (1983). Despite a whole range of practical and 
theoretical problems, partly addressed in King (1987), the parametric estimation of 
demand systems and welfare measures is one of the tools applied to designing reforms 
in Eastern European Countries; see Pudney (1991) for Hungary.
4.1.1 Classification of Approaches
Traditionally, applied economists have (mis)used parametric estimation of demand 
systems as the basis for welfare calculations, even when the correct welfare measures 
are considered. Good summaries of parametric approaches to demand analysis can 
be found in Deaton (1986), Blundell (1988) and an excellent book by Thomas (1987). 
Thomas distinguishes between two schools of thought.
1. Those who initially specify a family of (direct or indirect) utility functions for 
the consumer, then derive and estimate the parameters of the utility function by 
estimating corresponding demand functions. It is guaranteed that the obtained 
functional forms satisfy all restrictions imposed by consumer theory. Klein and 
Rubin (1947) were probably among the first to pioneer this approach. Later 
examples are the linear expenditure system (LES) used by Stone (1954) and 
the indirect addilog model of Houthakker (1960).
2. Those who start from a general set of demand functions, not necessarily derived 
from a parametric family of direct or even indirect utility functions, then test 
for consistency with utility maximisation, impose the necessary restrictions, 
reestimate and recover the expenditure and indirect utility functions. Initially 
one has to estimate the full n(n + 1) price and total expenditure responses. 
In practice, n, the number of commodity groups, has to be kept rather small. 
Examples are the Rotterdam model by Theil (1965) and Barten (1969)41 and 
the double logarithmic system, applied by Byron (1970a,70b).
A third approach is a combination of the former two. It starts from “flexible functional 
forms” that approximate locally a general expenditure function or the corresponding
4'There are good reasons to believe that the Rotterdam model never satisfies the general restric­




























































































indirect utility function. They also generate demand equations which do not necessar­
ily satisfy the general restrictions of theory. This approach was inspired by Diewert 
(1971). Examples are the direct and the indirect translog model, Christensen, Jor­
genson and Lau (1975) and the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980).
King (1983) has presented a computer program, the Tax Reform Analysis Package 
(TRAP), that estimates welfare measures using any of the examples for approach one 
and flexible functional forms.
Hausman (1981) argues the case for the second parametric approach. ”My approach 
differs from much recent work in that I begin with the observed market demand curve 
and then derive the unobserved indirect utility function and expenditure function. 
The more common approach is to start from a specification of the utility function, 
for example, Stone-Geary or translog, and then estimate the unknown parameters 
from the derived market demand functions. The method used here seems preferable 
on two grounds. First, the only observable data are the market demand data so good 
econometric practice would indicate finding a function that fits the data well. Thus 
different specifications of the demand function, not the utility function, would be fit 
with the best-fitting demand equation chosen to base the applied welfare analysis 
on. Second, specifications such as the translog functions force all the demand curves 
to have the same functional form which are often difficult to fit econometrically. ...” 
[Hausman (1981), page 664].
4.1.2 Presentation of estimation results
Estimates of social welfare measures usually give a single number and do not leave the 
applied economist with many presentational choices. Individual welfare measures are 
more subtle. King (1983) was the first to report individual welfare changes over the 
range of the income distribution and the associated confidence regions. Since then, 
general mathematical and statistical packages, like M athematicalM and SA&rM, 
have come to feature graphical possibilities that open new avenues to applied public 
economists. One possibility is to report individual measures of equivalent variation 
over the income range and a range of price changes.
To illustrate this possibility, consider the second example in Hausman (1981). Haus­
man reports a hypothetical long run demand function for petrol of the form42,
Xi = apt +  6y + 27 . (7)




























































































The corresponding expenditure function is Hausraan’s equation (17),
(8)
Using this information Hausman calculates the compensating variation for the ’’mean” 
person43, who would lie somewhere in the middle of the surface in Figure 2.
What Figure 2 tries to illustrate is the importance of reporting distributions of equiv­
alent variation, not single numbers based on averaging over years and individuals. 
For the ’’mean” individual with an income of $720, the equivalent variation for a 
price change from $0.75 to $1.00 is $34.9544. For the same household and a price
43As was argued before, this “mean” person might be wholly unrepresentative of the total popu­
lation. Ignoring the theoretical problems associated with compensating variations, reporting such a 
number in applied work is not only uninformative: it is misleading.
44Hausman computed a compensating variation of $37.17. A Marshallian approximation, favoured 
by Willig (1976), gives $35.99 per month. The equivalent variation computed here implies a 6.2% 
difference between EV and CV and a 3% difference between EV and CS. As Willig noted, in terms 
of these numbers it does not make a big difference which of the measures one uses. However, the 
differences in this simple example are misleading. For more realistic demand functions and more 
than one price change the gaps can become substantial.




Figure 2.: Own Calculation of Equivalent Variation for 
for Hausman (1981) equation (37). Incomes from $500 
to $15,000 per month. Initial price $0.75, new prices 




























































































change from $0.75 to $2.50 the equivalent variation is $67.13. For a household with 
$8000 a month the equivalent variation for the $0.75-$ 1.50 price change is $469.18, 
for $0.75-$2.50 it is $1040.32. These numbers represent 4.9%, 9.0%, 5.9% and 13% 
of monthly reference income respectively45.
For single price changes King (1983) remains the 'state of the art’. He gives confidence 
intervals for each estimate of the equivalent variation locus. Although it implies a 
great deal of extra work, unless one uses a package like TRAP, it is desirable that all 
applied work adopts this good practice46.
4.2 N o n p a ra m e tric  E s tim a tio n  o f E xac t W elfare M easures
4.2.1 M ethods based on Revealed Preference
Although he was probably not the first, Varian (1982a,b) has forcefully attacked the 
parametric approach to demand analysis47. To him, estimating demand systems serves 
two main purposes: one, making welfare judgements; two, forecasting demand given 
new price configurations. He argues that parametric estimation is not suitable for ei­
ther. The first approach, specifying a utility function and deriving demand functions 
uses no information about other possible parametric (or non-parametric) specifica­
tions which the data might reveal. The second approach is satisfactory only when the 
parametric specifications is a good approximation to the “true” demand functions. If 
not, the tests that are meant to ensure consistency with utility maximisation are not 
valid, since the test statistics contain misspecification bias. Flexible functional forms, 
a  combination of approaches one and two, suffer from the same shortcomings.
Varian deals with this integrability problem by applying the theory of revealed prefer­
ence. He asks how raw data itself , not a parametric form of demand function, can be
4sAg&in, the percentages would differ rather more if the example was non linear and considered 
more than one price change.
46In recent work, Kling and Sexton (1990) have used bootstrapping to estimate the statistical 
properties of two common, parametric specifications of a single demand curve (parametric approach 
two). Using the methods suggested in Freedman and Peters (1984), they resample from the error 
distribution of their estimated equations (for a textbook introduction to bootstrapping see, for 
example, Hardle (1990).). For linear and semilog demand functions, they find that their estimator 
can be very imprecise. They also find that precision primarily depends on the size and quality of 
the underlying data. Hence they conclude that “there may be higher returns to collecting more 
and better data than from worrying about theoretical discrepancies between various measures” 
[Kling and Sexton (1990), page 418). While this conclusion is debatable, there is no doubt that 
bootstrapping might be a serious alternative to asymtotics for constructing standard errors, or 
confidence intervals for the empirical welfare measures. It also has the added advantage of making 
no assumptions about the error distributions.
4TVarian’s work is closely related to Afriat (1967) and Afriat (1977). Unfortunately, these tend to 




























































































tested for consistency with preference maximisation, how the underlying preferences 
can be recovered from a cloud of observations, and whether it is still possible to model 
consumers’ responses to price changes. Varian approaches the problem by defining 
when a budget (prices and expenditures) is revealed preferred or revealed worse. This 
gives the conditions under which the actual choices observed can be tested for con­
sistency. Furthermore, he defines upper and lower bounds for the “money metric” 
utility function of Samuelson (1979), two constructs he calls under- and overcompen­
sation functions. The question here is to determine, not whether, but by how much a 
bundle is preferred to another. The analysis is extended to the indirect income com­
pensation function48, bounded by the indirect overcompensation function and indirect 
undercompensation function.
In section 7 of the paper Varian applies some of the algorithms for calculating over- 
and undercompensation functions to actual data. For aggregate data, he reports con­
sistency with the General Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), contradicting stud­
ies that have used parametric methods. He gives a very convincing explanation for 
this result. Post war aggregate data for the U.S. is characterised by small changes in 
relative prices and, up to three years before Varian’s writing, large increases in mean 
income. Hence, each year was revealed preferred to the previous year. The “repre­
sentative consumer” was able to buy the bundles of each of the previous years. Or, 
thinking about it the other way round, the ’’representative consumer” in the previ­
ous years was unable to buy any of the bundles in later years. Therefore, observed 
aggregate behaviour must satisfy GARP. Varian concludes that parametric methods 
have not rejected utility maximisation, but the chosen parametric form has. It seems 
that this, first of all, casts doubt on the usefulness of analysing aggregate data in 
applied demand analysis, but also, it gives additional ammunition to alternative and, 
strangely enough, still unorthodox approaches to estimating individual and social 
welfare.
Varian also computes approximations to his “true” over- and under-compensation 
functions and thus calculates a “true cost of living index”. Although methodologically 
interesting, the computed measures do not appear to be very reliable. The price varia­
tion in the data is simply too small and possibly overshadowed by the approximation 
errors. In general, Varian’s bounds are not sufficiently close to the “true” measures. 
Nonpairametric estimation promises to obtain these directly, while retaining the spirit 
of Varian’s analysis.




























































































Nonparametric methods in the econometric context are not the distribution free meth­
ods which one refers to, under the same name, in statistics, although they have a lot 
in common. Nonparametric methods in economics try to estimate a relationship be­
tween variables without imposing a prespecified functional form. Parametric methods 
do use such functional forms, which are imposed on the data, giving rise to the familiar 
misspecification problem.
Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. Nonparametric methods are able 
to capture unexpected features in the data, and to explore an unknown relationship 
between variables; the specification is not anchored in theory. On the other hand, 
provided one chooses the correct functional form, parametric methods are suitable 
for testing parameterisations derived from economic theory. Blossfeld, Hamerle and 
Mayer (1989) draw attention to this important methodological issue in the context 
of estimating hazard functions. Using the semiparametric Cox proportional hazards 
model, an investigator can obtain the influence of covariates without having to make 
further assumptions about the form of the hazard-rate path. However, when in­
terested in testing specific hypotheses, for example a human capital explanation of 
returns to schooling, regarding the hazard path itself, the use of parametric methods 
is required.
In the context of estimating welfare measures, are nonparametric methods the suitable 
choice of technique? What question does one try to answer ? If the question was “do 
consumers in country X possess a utility function Y, maximise utility subject to a 
budget constraint and exhibit a demand function of functional form Z ?” parametric 
and not nonparametric methods should be implemented. In the context of estimating 
welfare measures, the question is a different one. The applied public economist does 
not know the preference ordering of the consumers in the country of interest, indeed, 
consumers might exhibit different preference orderings, utility and demand functions. 
What one can hope to do is to fit a parameter free functional form, as best as one 
can, to observed demands for each consumer or cohort. Non parametric estimation 
of demand systems corresponds to parametric approach two. Hence, nonparametric 
estimation is the preferred technique for welfare analysis, if (parametric) approach 
two is more suitable than one and nonparametric is superior to parametric estimation. 
The most severe limitation of the nonparametric approach lies in the lack of available 
micro-data sets with many and frequent observations over time for large cross sections 
and many goods.




























































































4.2.3 N onparam etric E stim ation in Practice
In very recent and yet unpublished work, Jerry Hausman and Whitney Newey at 
MIT have obtained nonparametric (and parametric) estimates of gasoline demand 
for the United States, using micro-data collected at the household level. They use 
their estimates to derive exact welfare measures, following the procedure previously 
suggested in Hausman (1981). The paper by Hausman and Newey is the potential 
bench-mark for future work in this area.
Hausman and Newey have monthly data for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985 
and 1988 and a total of 18,113 observations. Although the first three surveys are split 
into eight, the latter into nine regions, they do not report how much regional price 
variation was in the data. Hausman and Newey had 72 data points to describe an 
intra household price variation from $1.34—$1.46, on average, for 1979-81 to $0.83 in 
1988, all at 1983 prices.
Hausman and Newey use kernel estimators and they experiment with different band- 
widths. The smoothing parameter selection problem is addressed by an analytical 
method due to Silverman (1985), for density estimation under normality, and the 
cross-validation method discussed in Hardle (1990).
They fit a single nonparametric equation (with dummy shifts) of the form
where g* is household petrol demand, p( petrol price, yx household income and Zt a 
matrix of 20 indicator variables for different region and survey year effects. Here g is 
the nonparametric function to be estimated.
Recovering the exact welfare measures is based on Roy’s identity, which establishes 
a link between the demand functions and the indirect utility function.
Roy’s identity is a partial differential equation. Hausman (1981) shows how this par­
tial differential equation (PDE) can be transformed into an ordinary differential equa­
tion (ODE), not an unimportant detail when trying to apply numerical methods to 
find a solution. The ordinary differential equation that is used to recover the welfare 
measures is
log qi = g(logpi, log yi) + Zi-y + (i =  1..... ,n)
































































































For the nonparametric case, Hausman and Newey make a ‘guess’ at the form of the 
solution and define
S(p,y°) = y ° -e (p ,  u1) (13)
By differentiating with respect to p and remembering Shepard’s lemma, it can be 
checked that this has the right form.
—^ r — ^ = hi(p,ul)==Xi(p,e(j),u1)) Shepard’s lemma (14)opt
Hence, and since e(p,u‘) =  S(p,po) - y o  = S(p,y) -  y,
~  ~ x  (p ,e(P,u*)) =  ~ x  (P’V ~ S(p,y)) with S(p‘,p) = 0 (15)
which checks with the ODE defined above.
Furthermore, since
x(p,y) 
x (p ,y  — S{p,y))
exp (g(logp, log y))
exp (a (logp, log(p -  5(p, y)))
(16)
the desired ODE becomes
=  -exp(a(logp,log(j/-5(p ,j/)))) (17)
Hausman and Newey solve this equation by the fourth order Runge-Kutta algorithm, 
a standard method for solving systems of ordinary differential equations that is some­
times not very efficient but is stable in most cases.
A comparison of parametric and nonparametric average demand reveals that the 
non-parametrically estimated demand curve contains a lot more local information, 
as was to be expected. The derivation of a sampling distribution for the nonparametric 
estimator of welfare change draws on Newey (1988). Hausman and Newey find that 
the rate of convergence for the estimated equivalent variation is considerably faster 
than the rate of convergence for the nonparametric estimates themselves. Although 
one must await publication of the draft paper, it seems that this result is related to 




























































































case, there is a tradeoff between getting an estimate of an unrepresentative and, in a 
way, unethical “welfare measure” with a well behaved asymptotic distribution and a 
more informative range of welfare measures, but with a weaker or unknown sampling 
distribution.
Extending the Hausman and Newey specification to two goods and more than one 
price change gives,
logiju =  (log pi,, log p2,, log yt) + Z iji + eu (18)
log ga =  P2 (log pu , log P2i, log pi) + Z;7j + e2i (t =  1..... . n)
E[eu | p i i , P 2i , y i ]  =  0
E[ea | p i i , P 2 i , t / i ]  =  0
E[e H.eal =  0
(19)
where g\ and g2 are the functions to be estimated nonparametrically. Ignoring Slutsky 
symmetry for the moment, both equations can be estimated separately, since they 
are reduced forms. The usual issues of identification and cross equation restrictions 
do not arise for the unresricted estimates. However, the issue of Slutsky symmetry 
still arises (discussed in a later section).
In effect, system estimation adds another dimension to the smoothing problems. 
Hardle (1990) has a chapter on “smoothing in higher dimensions” , Silverman (1985) 
considers “the kernel method for multivariate data”. The challenge and limitation 
to smoothing in higher dimensions, to use Hardle’s expression, is the data required 
to approximate surfaces in spaces of higher order. Silverman (page 94) reports the 






































































































For applications in economics, even with very large micro data sets, 8 is the largest 
dimension one can ever hope to model49.
4.2.4 Price Variation
A common problem in demand analysis stems from the difficulty of obtaining enough 
data that contains a sufficient degree of price variation; a problem that is exacerbated 
when trying to use nonparametric techniques. There are two sources of price variation 
in household survey data, variation over time, intra-household variation, and vari­
ation over a cross-section, inter-household variation. Household specific real prices 
can be calculated by dividing the reported expenditure by quantity purchased and 
deflating by the general price index. Usually, one finds a considerable degree of vari­
ation in a single cross-section. However, such variation is inevitably misleading and 
more reflects varieties or qualities purchased than differences in true prices. Pudney 
(1991) recommends that inter-household price information is used only when it can 
be identified with household location. Ideally, these are, again, grouped into cells that 
have the same income and social class composition. One can also argue for including 
demographic criteria. Unless one has a very large cross-section for a big country, like 
the U.S., which is more likely to have regional price variation for some products, very 
few additional data points result.
Hence, the main source of price variation is intra-household price variation. To have 
enough, one must hope to have data for several years and preferably on a monthly 
basis. Monthly data captures the substantial seasonal price variation, which can be 
often larger than real price variation over a longer period. Quarterly data too is 
promising.
4#Maybe this is too pessimistic and the use of, for example, squashing functions will provide a 




























































































In general, estimating responses to price variation nonparametrically poses a serious 
data problem. There are no ready answers and very few studies to draw on. One pos­
sible way around the data problem is the semi-parametric estimation of a demand 
system, estimating parametrically over prices (time) and nonparametrically over in­
come (cross-section and time). Such a specification, retaining the previous notation, 
is given by
log?» =  9 i(logy.) + P n  logpi, + /312logp2, +  Z,7i +
log =  92(log !/,) +  /?21 logpH +  fe lo g P 2 i +  Z O t +  e2i (i =  1 , ••••,«)
•B[eii|pii,P2i,yi] = 0  
£[e2i|Pn,P2i,yi] =  0 
^ [e ii,e2i] =  0
Although this approach takes away most of the spirit, and advantages of the nonpara- 
metric approach, it is, short of collecting richer data sets, the only feasible alternative 
for systems estimation. Note, the identification issue and cross equation restrictions 
do arise with this specification.
4.3 In teg rab ility  C onditions
The estimated functions 91 and 92 are continuously differentiable, obtaining the Hes­
sian poses, in principle, no difficulties. However, can one impose symmetry and neg­
ative semi-definiteness without losing the advantages of nonparametric estimation? 
The obvious solution to imposing the negative semi-definite constraint is the choice 
of the smoothing parameter, a strategy that equally applies to smoothing in higher 
dimensions.
The issue of symmetry does not arise for single equations, but is essential for de­
mand systems. Unless symmetry is imposed, there are no numerical solutions to the 
system of differential equations, the expenditure functions can not be retrieved and 
exact welfare analysis is no longer possible. Like negative semi-definiteness, symmetry 
should be imposed in the smoothing process itself. Indeed, imposing such restrictions 
might reduce the dimensionality problem significantly and render the estimation of 
larger demand systems possible. However, it is not clear how symmetry can be im­
posed in practice. Unless it is done properly, one would lose too many of the desirable 
properties of the nonparametric approach.
If the nonparametric approach to estimating welfare measures is to have any practical 




























































































and recover the expenditure functions by solving the resulting system of differential 
equations numerically. These issues pose challenging problems to statisticians and 
applied micro economists.
4.4 C onclusion
In his survey article on ‘Demand Analysis’ for the Handbook of Econometrics, Angus 
Deaton stated that “there is no valid theoretical or practiced reason for ever integrat­
ing under a Marshallian demeind curve. The very considerable literature discussing 
the practical difficulties of doing so (the path independence of the integred, for exam- 
ple) provides a remarkable example of the elaboration of secondary nonsense which 
can occur once a large primary category error has been accepted; the emperor with 
no clothes, although quite aware of his total nakedness, is continuously distressed by 
his inability to tie his shoelaces.” (Deaton (1986), p. 1826). Six years after publication 
the emperor, in many parts, is still without clothes. Applied work in industrial or­
ganisation, agricultural and environmental economics (and elsewhere) still computes 
Marshallian consumer surplus measures, or CS approximations to CV, to measure 
the welfare of the individual and sums surpluses to measure the welfare of society. 
In the traditional area of parametric estimation, there is, until now, one well known 
application that explicitly computes ranges of equivalent variations; King (1983).
The theory of individual welfare measures is well defined and does not pose great 
conceptual difficulties. Nevertheless, valid applications of the theory for policy analy­
sis remain scarce. The theory and estimation of social welfare measures are difficult. 
Many of the existing measures are hard to interpret, especially since it is not clear 
what value judgements have been used in their construction. However, simply sum­
ming up individual welfare measures, although it is very clear what value judgements 
have been used, is not a solution. Although Hammond’s measure is easier to interpret 
than the others, maybe an alternative to the money metric, for example the income 
tax measure proposed in Section 4.2 of Hammond (1990) is more intuitive.
For estimation, it has been shown that the traditional, parametric methods of demand 
analysis lend themselves to welfare estimation, as suggested by theory. Extended 
versions of packages like TRAP, which include the step from the estimated demand 
function to the cost function, can remove the temptation to resort to consumer surplus 
based welfare measures in policy analysis50.
For nonparametric estimation, two main technical challenges have been identified; 
one, deriving sampling distributions for the estimated welfare measures; two, impos­
50Mathematica 2.0 already includes a function that symbolically solves basic differential equations. 
The numerical algorithms provided by Vartia (1983) can be applied even when there is no explicit 




























































































ing symmetry on the Slutsky matrix of second order derivatives of the expenditure 
function. Conceptually, both problems seem to have a solution. Data limitations ap­
pear severe, but if the nonparametric approach proves easier, more accurate and 
more powerful than the traditional parametric methods, one expects governments to 
commission new surveys and employ research teams to conduct the kind of analysis 
presented, but on a much larger scale; one should hope so anyway.
On the whole, given the importance and history of the subject, the literature ap­





























































































A ppendix: JEL A bstract-Search
Journal Count Percent
Acta Oeconomica 1 0.54
American Economic Review 16 8.65
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 19 10.3
Annals of Regional Science 2 1.08
Applied Economics 2 1.08
Atlantic Economic Journal 3 1.62
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 5 2.70
Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press 1 0.54
Bulletin of Economic Research 3 1.62
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 3 1.62
Canadian Journal of Economics 2 1.08
Consommation 1 0.54
Contemporary Policy Issues 1 0.54
Econometrica 5 2.70
Economia Politica 1 0.54
Economic Geography 4 2.16
Economic Inquiry 1 0.54
Economic Journal 3 1.62
Economic Record 1 0.54
Economica 2 1.08
Energy Economics 1 0.54
Engineering Economist 1 0.54
European Economic Review 1 0.54
History of Political Economy 2 1.08
Indian Economic Journal 1 0.54
Information Economics and Policy 1 0.54
International Economic Review 6 3.24
International Journal of Industrial Organization 3 1.62
Journal of Agricultural Economics 2 1.08
Journal of Consumer Affairs 1 0.54
Journal of Economic Issues 1 0.54
Journal of Economic Literature 1 0.54
Journal of Economic Studies 1 0.54




























































































A ppendix: JEL A bstract-Search (continued)
Journal Count Percent
Journal of Economic Theory 4 2.16
Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie) 1 0.54
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 4 2.16
Journal of Industrial Economics 4 2.16
Journal of International Economics 1 0.54
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 1 0.54
Journal of Political Economy 7 3.78
Journal of Public Economics 5 2.70
Journal of Regulatory Economics 1 0.54
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 0.54
Kyklœ 1 0.54
Land Economics 7 3.78
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies 2 1.08
Marine Resource Economics 1 0.54
Osaka Economic Papers 1 0.54
Oxford Economic Papers, N. S. 1 0.54
Public Finance 4 2.16
Quarterly Journal of Economics 4 2.16
Rand Journal of Economics 5 2.70
Regional Science Perspectives 1 0.54
Regional Studies 2 1.08
Review of Economic Studies 5 2.70
Review of Economics and Statistics 1 0.54
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 1 0.54
Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 1 0.54
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 3 1.62
Social Choice and Welfare 1 0.54
Southern Economic Journal 6 3.24
Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 1 0.54
Swedish Journal of Economics 2 1.08
Urban Studies 1 0.54
Water Resources Research 1 0.54
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1 0.54
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 1 0.54
Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 3 1.62
Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 1 0.54
Total 185
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